Thinking Matters - Latest Comments

Re: Why doesn’t God just do whatever it takes to make people believe in him?

Stuart McEwing — Tue, 18 Feb 2014 18:00:27 -0000

Ian, I know its off topic, but a first cause of the universe is not required by virtue of a gap in knowledge (i.e. by what we DON’T know). Its needed by virtue of something we DO know, namely, that the universe began to exist. Secondly, people do know what secondary causes are, just like people know what “creation” means - their definitions are given in common dictionaries.

Re: Why doesn’t God just do whatever it takes to make people believe in him?

D Bnonn Tennant — Tue, 18 Feb 2014 17:51:48 -0000

The first cause notion sits firmly in the "and then a miracle occurs" category of understanding things.

You keep making these bold statements completely devoid of any reasoning to back them up. My suggestion would either be to learn how to argue for your position, or stop writing cheques with your mouth that your brain can't bank.

we only know its needed by virtue of a gap in knowledge.

Saying this just shows that you don't even have the most tenuous grasp on the first cause argument. It is not an empirical argument to the best explanation. It is a metaphysical proof of principle. You can disagree that it succeeds as such, but then you need to defeat it on its own terms. Mistaking it for something completely different just shows how blinkered you are. It's like you can't even imagine discerning anything by non-scientific methods. Yet the scientific method rests on these kinds of metaphysical arguments.

We don't even know what secondary causes are, let alone what the first one might be.

Who are you speaking for? Who is this "we"? You need to stop imputing your own gross ignorance of basic metaphysics to everyone else. Causality as a mechanism may be mysterious, but that doesn't mean we can't know anything about the types of causation.

nothing you have argued says anything about why god doesn't make everyone believe or love, it just sidesteps the issue.

Since I didn't intend to address that question, this objection misses the mark.

it is manifestly obvious we know very very little about it

Again, you need to stop imputing your own ignorance to everyone else. God is quite clear in the Bible about his reasons for creating, and his reasons for not saving everyone.

answering questions like this with the certainty you seem to have seems to be seriously over-reaching.

I'm putting this in the jar for Most Ironic Statements of 2014. We'll be announcing the winner early next year.

Re: Why doesn’t God just do whatever it takes to make people believe in him?

Ian — Tue, 18 Feb 2014 17:27:10 -0000

The first cause notion sits firmly in the "and then a miracle occurs" category of understanding things. Even given the argument it is needed (which isn't a given by any stretch but that's an argument for another day) we only know its needed by virtue of a gap in knowledge. We don't even know what secondary causes are, let alone what the first one might be. Therefore the word creation (in terms of first causes) is at best a place-holder, not useful in any descriptive sense.

But to return to the OP, nothing you have argued says anything about why god doesn't make everyone believe or love, it just sidesteps the issue. This is necessary because even if a god does exist in some form or another, it is manifestly obvious we know very very little about it, so answering questions like this with the certainty you seem to have seems to be seriously over-reaching.

Re: Why doesn’t God just do whatever it takes to make people believe in him?

D Bnonn Tennant — Tue, 18 Feb 2014 00:03:26 -0000

I am not sure what is coherent about it. We have never seen an act of pure creation or first causism, so I am quite confident in stating no-one has a clue what such a thing entails.

You seem to think that if we can't describe the mechanism of creation, then we can't understand the concept of creation. But the very fact that you're talking about creation and we both know what it means puts the lie to this idea.

I don't know where to start to use that as far as describing something goes.

Then you need to study some basic ontology. Anything exists either necessarily or contingently. If you don't understand this distinction, then it's no surprise you think the various cosmological arguments are no good. I'd recommend you check out http://bnonn.thinkingmatter... for a primer. Note that there's a part 2 which illustrates the surprising number of things we can infer about the first cause, given what is created.

It seems to me there are infinite things that could be known. Infinites are messy.

Infinites are only messy when they have to exist in spacetime. There is nothing messy about saying that the set of natural numbers is infinite; nor with saying that God knows all natural numbers. If you think otherwise, you need to provide an argument.

Can you be happiness? Because that makes as much sense as being love.

Happiness is a poor example. Goodness would be better. But the Bible explains the manner in which God is love via the doctrine of the Trinity. There isn't anything incoherent about saying that the three persons of the Godhead eternally love each other, and that this is what it means to say God is love.

My point is not that you don't have words you can use descriptively in gods general direction - it is that they don't actually form a picture of anything

You are assuming that because they don't form a picture for you, they don't form a picture for anyone. But why would philosophers since Aristotle (at least) seriously think about, explicate, and debate ideas like divine simplicity if they literally meant nothing? I mean, which is more likely -- that you don't get something which many of the greatest thinkers have understood and thought to be very important, or that you have easily discerned the actual incoherence and incomprehensibility of ideas which these great thinkers mistakenly thought were meaningful and understandable?

Now what would a necessary first cause have to be like? I doubt very much we have the remotest idea.

Well, for starters it would have exist necessarily, and be pure actuality. Again, the fact that those terms mean nothing to you doesn't imply they mean nothing to me. On the contrary, what it implies is that you are missing something fundamental.

what exactly is an immaterial force of great power? Force and power are terms I know from physics but don't really apply here and immaterial isn't something easily relatable.

Again, this is something well-defined in theology and philosophy. We know that many of the terms we predicate of God are analogical. For example, Ed Feser explains:

Now, for the Thomist, a proper understanding of these various aspects of classical theism requires a recognition that when we predicate goodness, knowledge, power, or what have you of God, we are using language in a way that is analogous to the use we make of it when applied to the created order... It has to do...with Aquinas’s famous “doctrine of analogy,” which distinguishes three uses of language: Words can be used univocally, in exactly the same sense, as when we say that Fido’s bark is loud and that Rover’s bark is loud. They can be used equivocally, or in completely unrelated senses, as when we say that Fido’s bark is loud and that the tree’s bark is rough. Or they can be used analogously, as when we say that a certain meal was good, that a certain book is good, and that a certain man is good. “Good” is not being used in exactly the same sense in each case, but neither are the senses unrelated, as they are in the equivocal use of “bark.” Rather, there is in the goodness of a meal something analogous to the goodness of a book, and analogous to the goodness of a man, even if it is not exactly the same sort of thing that constitutes the goodness in each case.

Again, there is nothing incoherent or meaningless about this; it doesn't show that we can't know anything about God. It just shows us that we can't know anything about God in the way that God knows it. Because we're not God. Obviously.

So you claim god is all powerful within a set of rules, presumably a set of rules that we will probably never understand?

Since I specified the set of rules (namely broad logical possibility), I'm not sure why you'd think we could never understand them. Broad logical possibility refers to what, metaphysically speaking, could take place. It precludes direct logical contradictions, along with other impossible circumstances. Again, it sounds like you need to read up on some basic metaphysical categories. I find it very surprising that you'd come in here claiming we can know nothing about God when in fact the problem is simply your own ignorance. Why would you claim to know such things when you obviously aren't qualified to comment?

what gives him the power to do the impossible and be a first cause?

You're assuming that being a first cause is metaphysically impossible. That's a highly idiosyncratic position that you need to argue for. Why should anyone accept it?

If first causes are broadly logically possible, then the comsological argument seems to hit trouble - well the god part of it anyway.

On the contrary, this is the whole point of cosmological arguments. If you think the God part runs into trouble, you need to give an argument to that effect.

I conclude that whatver I do next, god knew I was going to do it

More than that, he caused it (though not in the sense of the "mundane" causation we are familiar with).

so I might as well not care about what god wants

You're speaking in non-sequiturs. How does this follow?

Shouldn't it be?

You need to explain your position. Why should we think of Christianity as fatalistic? In what sense does God's omnipotence entail fatalism?

Re: Why doesn’t God just do whatever it takes to make people believe in him?

Ian — Mon, 17 Feb 2014 23:24:24 -0000

Cool - 1 put to bed.

What is incoherent about describing God as the creator of all things, for example?

I am not sure what is coherent about it. We have never seen an act of pure creation or first causism, so I am quite confident in stating no-one has a clue what such a thing entails.

What is incoherent about describing him as necessary?

I don't know where to start to use that as far as describing something goes.

Or possessing all knowledge?

It seems to me there are infinite things that could be known. Infinites are messy.

Or being love?

Can you be happiness? Because that makes as much sense as being love.

Or being non-composite (simple)?

My point is not that you don't have words you can use descriptively in gods general direction - it is that they don't actually form a picture of anything, and certainly nothing sufficiently concrete as to be loveable.

Even if this were true, which is quite unclear since we can know a great deal about something from what it does, your comment is inadvertently comical since "first", "loving" and "pervasive" are adjectives.

Yeah my technical language skills are not a strength. Still if we say a thing barks, then we go "oh, it must be like a dog", a thing we do have a description for that does that thing. When we say it's "first", what do we learn about the thing itself? Nothing because we don't have another thing that was first to relate it to. Now you can say "something first is needed" (I don't think it is, but that aside) but you can't say anything about what it is other than what is needed to be first. Now what would a necessary first cause have to be like? I doubt very much we have the remotest idea.

Even if we only had a minimal description of God as a necessary, immaterial force of great power, that would be quite sufficient to know if there is good evidence for his existence,

But quite far from making it sufficiently well described to be even remotely loveable. As an aside, what exactly is an immaterial force of great power? Force and power are terms I know from physics but don't really apply here and immaterial isn't something easily relatable. This language seems to me more metaphorical (watch me get that term wrong as well) than literal.

Another assertion in lieu of an argument. Why would they be meaningless? Do you think "all powerful" means "possessing the ability to do anything imaginable"? If so, you're simply burning a strawman, since that is not what theologians have ever taken omnipotence to entail.

I'm very happy to hear you say that - because more than once I have had Christians tell me otherwise. So you claim god is all powerful within a set of rules, presumably a set of rules that we will probably never understand?

Rather, omnipotence refers to the ability to do anything broadly logically possible.

If god can only do that which is "broadly" logically possible, what gives him the power to do the impossible and be a first cause? If first causes are broadly logically possible, then the comsological argument seems to hit trouble - well the god part of it anyway.

Moreover, it seems "broadly" logically possible that I could be made to believe and love a god like thing. So that doesn't get him out of dodge just yet. Presumably you think god knows enough and is powerful enough to do the things I described. Therefore I conclude that whatver I do next, god knew I was going to do it, and so I might as well not care about what god wants (which god knew I'd do) and think about other things (which god knew I would).

Christianity is not fatalistic.

Shouldn't it be?

Re: Why doesn’t God just do whatever it takes to make people believe in him?

D Bnonn Tennant — Mon, 17 Feb 2014 21:24:03 -0000

My point with 1 was, in response to your argument, that belief is not sufficient - my point was it is kind of necessary though. Therefore the original question stands.

The way atheists seem to pose the question is as if belief is sufficient; I'm simply responding on their own terms. Obviously I agree that to love God you must believe in him; as Hebrews 11:6 puts it, "Without faith it is impossible to be well pleasing to him, for he who comes to God must believe that he exists, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him."

No coherent description exists that I have seen - and certainly there isn't one in the bible.

It's hard to respond to a blanket assertion devoid of argumentation or examples. What is incoherent about describing God as the creator of all things, for example? What is incoherent about describing him as necessary? Or possessing all knowledge? Or being love? Or being non-composite (simple)? These are all clearly-defined terms in theology and philosophy, so you're just obviously wrong about this.

Descriptions need adjectives, not verbs. First mover or loving entity or pervasive influence etc etc don't actually say anything descriptive about the mover, lover or influencer.

Even if this were true, which is quite unclear since we can know a great deal about something from what it does, your comment is inadvertently comical since "first", "loving" and "pervasive" are adjectives.

The entire book assumes the word god actually means something - it never tries to describe what the word actually describes (beyond verbs).

Having not read Jenson I can't speak to his abilities as a theologian. But any good systematic theology will describe the attributes of God, and divide those attributes into communicable and non-communicable.

god isn't nearly well enough described to know if there is sufficient evidence, or whether or not it would convince an atheist.

Even if we only had a minimal description of God as a necessary, immaterial force of great power, that would be quite sufficient to know if there is good evidence for his existence, since the various forms of cosmological arguments going back to Aristotle are far more plausibly right than wrong.

Therefore it isn't impossible at all and I suspect you'd be obliged to argue a universe were it wasn't possible couldn't exist...

That's a fundamental presupposition of the first cause argument. You're making my case for me.

If god is a thing, and god is all powerful, then questions of possibility are meaningless.

Another assertion in lieu of an argument. Why would they be meaningless? Do you think "all powerful" means "possessing the ability to do anything imaginable"? If so, you're simply burning a strawman, since that is not what theologians have ever taken omnipotence to entail. Rather, omnipotence refers to the ability to do anything broadly logically possible. If you think God can create a square circle or a rock so heavy he can't lift it, you are not only mistaken and painfully ignorant of a topic you nonetheless feel quite confident in arguing about, but you're also unable to spot nonsense-statements when you see them. Not promising.

(Incidentally we have absolutely no idea how anything causes anything else to happen so questions of first causes are perhaps a bit beyond us right now).

Again, this is just confused. Rather than being an argument against a first cause, this is precisely a cog in the first cause argument! Aristotle distinguished between four different kinds of causes, and defined causation in terms of actualities and potentialities. His basic thesis was that since potentialities require some prior actuality in order to themselves become actual, there must be a first mover who is himself pure actuality. Again, this is one way in which God can be clearly defined, in strict philosophical terms which anyone can understand if they bother to put some time into studying the matter.

I can only assume, based on your statement that everything happens because of god, that my disbelief is precisely how god wants it.

In one sense, yes. But of course, God also wanted me to be an atheist for several years; that didn't mean he wanted me to remain an atheist. Christianity is not fatalistic.

This kind of pokes a hole in evangelism though - well a jagged and weird hole, but a hole nonetheless.

Another assertion in lieu of an argument. You make this statement like it's obviously true. But since evangelism is the instrumental means by which God saves people, it's actually obviously false.

The only answer, based on your response, is god doesn't want everyone to believe in it.

In one sense, yes. I actually think God does desire that everyone be saved; but that desire is contingent on his prior decree to create a world of people, many of whom will not be saved, because salvation is not the end of creation. The end of creation is the manifestation of God's perfections. So his ultimate desire is not to save everyone, since that is the better world given the end for which it was created.

Re: Why doesn’t God just do whatever it takes to make people believe in him?

Ian — Mon, 17 Feb 2014 20:45:45 -0000

My point with 1 was, in response to your argument, that belief is not sufficient - my point was it is kind of necessary though. Therefore the original question stands.

For 2/3 you kind of aid my point by saying firstly that the worlds greatest minds have been trying to describe and then move straight onto discussing evidence. No coherent description exists that I have seen - and certainly there isn't one in the bible. Descriptions need adjectives, not verbs. First mover or loving entity or pervasive influence etc etc don't actually say anything descriptive about the mover, lover or influencer. I have read quite a bit of theology and arbitrarily dug out an ebook of Systematic Theology (Jenson, 1994) to refresh after your comment. The entire book assumes the word god actually means something - it never tries to describe what the word actually describes (beyond verbs). It does spend a lot of time on what god does/did though. Anyway this is a distraction from the main point which is that god isn't nearly well enough described to know if there is sufficient evidence, or whether or not it would convince an atheist.

As an aside, the first causes argument is an interesting point - because according to you there is a way that contingent causes can be caused: god. Therefore it isn't impossible at all and I suspect you'd be obliged to argue a universe were it wasn't possible couldn't exist... If god is a thing, and god is all powerful, then questions of possibility are meaningless. (Incidentally we have absolutely no idea how anything causes anything else to happen so questions of first causes are perhaps a bit beyond us right now).

I can only assume, based on your statement that everything happens because of god, that my disbelief is precisely how god wants it. This kind of pokes a hole in evangelism though - well a jagged and weird hole, but a hole nonetheless.

The original question was "Why doesn’t God just do whatever it takes to make people believe in him?" The only answer, based on your response, is god doesn't want everyone to believe in it. No other argument works - for example the free will argument (god wants us to choose) relies on the fact that god doesn't know what we will do. You say god does know. And because god is all powerful, god could have it so everyone believes and loves god. God choses not to. Why?

Re: Why doesn’t God just do whatever it takes to make people believe in him?

D Bnonn Tennant — Mon, 17 Feb 2014 17:34:22 -0000

Hey Ian, (1) seems obvious so no need to reply to that. (2) and (3) are puzzling. In what sense can God not be described or understood? For thousands of years, some of the world's greatest minds have believed he could be described and understood, albeit not exhaustively; and they went about it in very precise, intellectually rigorous ways. They also produced mountains of evidence for God's existence. So while I guess (2) is true, it doesn't seem relevant to Christianity; and (3) just seems false.

Given what you say in (4), it sounds like you're assuming that since you don't understand what God is, the very idea of God must be inexplicable. That's quite a stretch, don't you think? I certainly don't share your difficulty. Maybe you should crack a systematic theology and read the section on God. Or if you're short on time, Wayne Grudem's "20 Basics Every Christian Should Know" has a couple of chapters at the beginning which are quite good.

necessarily everything that happens that is remotely influenced by gods actions necessarily occurs by choice of that god (either made to happen, or allowed to happen by omission).

I'd go further. I'd say that necessarily, everything that happens period occurs by choice of God. You seem to allow for things happening that are not influenced by God's actions; the Bible denies this. Nothing can happen apart from God. Indeed, the impossibility of contingent events causing themselves, or having an infinite regress of causes, is one of the classical evidences for God's existence.

If that's the case, then the original question you address stands unshaken.

You'll need to explain why I'm afraid. I'm not seeing it.

Re: Why doesn’t God just do whatever it takes to make people believe in him?

Ian — Mon, 17 Feb 2014 05:59:20 -0000

1. Presumably, however, most people would like to think something they love (whatever that means) actually exists.

2. It is pretty hard for evidence to exist of something that can't even be described or understood.

3. All we have is a language of description, and we don't describe what "god" is very well. Get that sorted then we can talk.

4. I don't hate god, I don't even have the remotest idea what god is. Why would I hate it?

The problem with giving god characteristics like all knowing, all loving, all powerful etc is that necessarily everything that happens that is remotely influenced by gods actions necessarily occurs by choice of that god (either made to happen, or allowed to happen by omission). Most Christians won't cede that their god is simply very powerful, vastly knowledgeable and pretty loving - its all or nothing. If that's the case, then the original question you address stands unshaken.

Re: Is Atheism Irrational? An Interview with Alvin Plantinga

D Bnonn Tennant — Thu, 13 Feb 2014 15:40:15 -0000

I agree with Stu :) It doesn't seem to make sense to say you fiercely love and have allegiance toward someone you don't know exists. That seems like the sort of thing cuckoo 40 year-old housewives do with Edward from Twilight. It ain't a sign of a well-functioning mind.

And anyone whose mind is functioning well is qualified to think through and assess the arguments for God (and for atheism), as long as they are careful :)

Anyway, I get where you're coming from wrt angry atheists. I don't think they can be argued into believing, necessarily. But we have to balance our desire to minister to them, with the recognition that these are people who think of themselves as rational, and therefore do need reasons to believe. That was certainly the case with me. I was a new atheist. God softened my heart with interpersonal interaction, but I needed to see solid arguments for faith before I was convinced that it was anything more than a nice fairy tale.

Re: Is Atheism Irrational? An Interview with Alvin Plantinga

Stuart McEwing — Thu, 13 Feb 2014 15:23:23 -0000

So what you’re saying is your a Christian without Christian belief? You see, and intuition is a belief - just one that isn’t particularly well thought through or strong. I think what you want to say is that you have Christian belief, and though you practice as a believing Christian should, you don’t hold to those beliefs particularly strongly. If so, then philosophy can really be a help to you. And if you understood a little more of philosophy, I suspect you will be able to understand non-Christian types better, and be able to help them have Christian intuitions rather than atheistic intuitions. Those are just two of the constructive roles philosophy can play.

Re: Is Atheism Irrational? An Interview with Alvin Plantinga

D Bnonn Tennant — Wed, 12 Feb 2014 22:52:17 -0000

Hey Iggy, I'm always glad to discuss ways to better reach out to unbelievers :)

in all honesty I can't tell who's got the better argument.

Really? Not to be a smart-ass, but if you can't tell whether Christians or atheists have the better argument, what makes you believe that Christians are right, rather than atheists?

It seems to me an opportunity to open a meaningful dialogue with secularists was wasted; instead, his post merely occasioned 900 angry responses

What would you have said in Plantinga's place? Again, I don't mean to be a smart-ass; I'm genuinely curious. Maybe there is a much better way Plantinga could have gone about answering those questions. I'm just not sure what it would be. How would you have done it?

In strict fairness to Plantinga, do you think he said anything unreasonable or intentionally offensive? I personally can't see that he did. He seemed to be trying very hard, as he always does, to be extremely even-handed and irenic.

But that being the case, it hardly seems fair to fault his response given the 900 angry comments. Surely if he did everything he could to be reasonable and fair, the 900 angry people are not his fault? It seems to me quite obvious that these were people who were already angry, and were looking for the opportunity to vent their anger. (Indeed, new atheism is characterized by an intense anger toward God.) But if that is closer to the truth of the matter, what could Plantinga possibly have said to mollify such people? Surely the fault lies not with him, but with the commenters?

Re: Is Atheism Irrational? An Interview with Alvin Plantinga

D Bnonn Tennant — Wed, 12 Feb 2014 17:30:04 -0000

Well, let's review his arguments...

1. Lack of evidence for something is not grounds for positive disbelief in that thing. This seems self-evident; I wonder what you find unconvincing about it.

2. Disbelieving in a teapot orbiting the sun is not based on lack of evidence for the teapot, but an obvious preponderance of evidence against the teapot. Again, this seems self-evidently true, and I wonder what you find unconvincing about it.

3. The problem of evil has to be balanced against the positive evidences for God's existence when assessing the rationality of theism. I thought Plantinga was quite weak on this, because the problem of evil has been crushed, philosophically speaking, and amounts to nothing more than an emotional appeal. I thought he gave it far too much credence, especially for someone sympathetic to Calvinism, who can present the biblical theodicy strongly: evil is necessary to fully reveal the perfections of God. If anything, the "problem" of evil is evidence for God's existence. Nonetheless, his point is still valid: if you think the PoE is evidence against God, you still need to weigh it against all the evidence for God.

4. Arguments are not required to have a rational belief in God, just as they are not required to have a rational belief in the existence of other people, or the past. Most people have some sense of God's existence which they simply know from inward experience. Again, what is unconvincing about this? Indeed, doesn't this fit directly in with what you said about "the life of faith" and what "most Christians experience"? Plantinga is arguing that religious experience makes belief in God rational even if you don't have any other evidence for his existence. He isn't saying that religious experience should convince atheists that God exists; he is saying that given what rationality is, atheists are simply mistaken to call faith irrational. If you think he is wrong about this, why?

5. The prior probability of the universe being fine-tuned is outrageously improbable on atheism, but highly problem on theism. Therefore, the fine-tuning of the universe weighs strongly in favor of theism. Again, this is true; anyone who denies it does not understand probability theory. I suspect he picked this example precisely because atheists pride themselves at being intellectual, so they of all people should understand the weight of the argument.

6. The best possible world(s) is one where God redeems sinners who don't deserve it. This seems to have a lot of intuitive weight. God cannot exercise the greatest amount of love without sin. He can't exercise mercy or justice or wrath at all. Etc. See (3), on God revealing his perfections.

7. See (1).

8. "The most important ground of belief is probably not philosophical argument but religious experience." Again, this directly speaks to the life of faith and Christian experience, so I'm wondering why you think his comments are so far removed from these things.

9. One reason atheists are atheists is that they don't want God to exist. In their more candid moments they admit as much. This is certainly biblical, and anyone who has spent much time talking to atheists knows it is true. Atheism is lived before it is believed; it is an emotional need justified after the fact with argumentation.

10. If evolution is true, we don't act based on beliefs, but based on physical processes. But in that case, our belief in evolution is not based on logical reasoning. Moreover, our belief-forming structures are chronically unreliable given probability theory. This is a very strong reason to disbelieve materialism; if you disagree, I'd love to know why.

Btw, it's kind of ironic at atheists bristling at being called irrational. They can dish it out, but they can't take it?"

In my experience, good people choose differently, and end up at very different places – and remain good people.

I'm not sure what you mean by "good". On the face of it, a Christian would not think there are any good people since there is an abundance of evidence against this view (Isa 64:6; Rom 3:10-11; Jer 17:9; Gen 6:5; John 3:19, 8:34; 1 Cor 2:14; Mark 10:18 etc). Maybe you can explain what you mean?

Re: The Kalam Cosmological Argument Explained

peanutaxis — Fri, 11 Oct 2013 00:24:16 -0000

http://www.youtube.com/watc...

Re: The Kalam Cosmological Argument Explained

peanutaxis — Sat, 05 Oct 2013 00:45:41 -0000

More vids on the history of science. The second video goes into why falsification is so important. Particularly relevant to supernaturalism/religion are the five points at 16:49. The very reason why religions/supernaturalism are so multiplistic and contradictory is because they do not set up satisfactory standards of evidence/falsification, and so adherents are merely exercising their confirmation bias.

The confirmation bias is essentially a backwards feedback, as many religious/supernaturalist adherents clearly set up their standards of evidence based on what they view as the strengths of their religion/worldview. But it could be that science is doing the same.

In terms of what a useful pursuit of knowledge ("satisfactory") might be then - and assuming that a multiplistic model is not desirable - the only way to go is a theory of knowledge that is consilient one. That is science.

http://www.youtube.com/watc...

Re: The Kalam Cosmological Argument Explained

peanutaxis — Wed, 25 Sep 2013 02:37:03 -0000

In case you're interested. Further SysyphusRedeemed videos on the history of science. Why logic just isn't at base.

http://www.youtube.com/watc...

Re: The Kalam Cosmological Argument Explained

peanutaxis — Mon, 23 Sep 2013 01:30:35 -0000

What a completely false choice. All the authors of the books I have read on the topic would agree that many of these arguments are silly in that there are perfectly good Naturalistic candidates as answers (it is these very questions which they pose in order to try to answer!). I certainly don't claim to be more intelligent or informed on the subject than they are.

Dear reader then,

There is NO research going on for consciousness from a non-physical side, to such an extent that Nagel calls for an entirely new field of science! It has become ever more apparent upon my requests for alternative theories that the only alternative 'research' is theology, which I doubt has done anything to elucidate any 'facts' about consciousness in thousands of years (if ever). In which case I invite you to read any research on consciousness, as it will undoubtedly reflect the nature of the field, and reality: that knowledge is either Natural or non-existent.

Re: The Kalam Cosmological Argument Explained

D Bnonn Tennant — Sun, 22 Sep 2013 19:37:21 -0000

it was just silly arguments

Here's what it boils down to:

Either you are significantly more intelligent than the people who study this topic for a job, and you see through what even the secular experts call the "hard" problem of consciousness...

...or you don't get it.

I leave the reader to decide which is more likely.

Re: The Kalam Cosmological Argument Explained

peanutaxis — Sat, 21 Sep 2013 23:41:08 -0000

Well, you didn't answer exactly the same questions when I asked a ages back. I think I can see why, though, it seem the answer is 'theology'.

Thanks, listened to the podcast. If it wasn't theological assertion of dualism it was just silly arguments like the fact that we refer to 'our' body meaning that there must be a soul that is the real 'me'. Or that every atom in our mind/body might change but we are still magically ourselves. Or the complete non-sequitur (and information-theory ignorance) that minds can be about things but trees can't(false!), therefore the mind is non physical. Particularly disturbing is the refusal to accept evidence to the point of being purposefully obtuse, like refusing to admit the obvious conclusion that the brain IS who we are and instead claiming that brain damage is the inability of the physical brain to "access" the mind/soul. Sheesh.
The best argument, I think, is the free will argument. But, again, this is just intuition - we don't like the idea that we don't have a choice. Either way, natural inquiry will wipe the floor with what we intuitively want to believe.

I think it's as I suspected. It's not really a position, it's an anti-position (except for theology), such that even an atheist like Nagel just has a vacuum where theology/mysticism would normally be. It's the next unfalsifiable refuge for the age-old intuitive anti-materialist push-back. Nagel's book might be interesting though.

Re: The Kalam Cosmological Argument Explained

D Bnonn Tennant — Thu, 19 Sep 2013 23:38:23 -0000

I'm sorry dude, I don't have time to go through this again. If you want to get a good sense for the various lines of argument, I'd really suggest you read someone like Reppert or Moreland on the topic. But coincidentally, J Warner Wallance recently did a good podcast on this which you might find helpful, entitled "Six reasons why you should believe in non-physical minds":

http://winteryknight.wordpr...

Re: The Kalam Cosmological Argument Explained

peanutaxis — Thu, 19 Sep 2013 23:28:12 -0000

You haven't though. You have been gainsaying of a physical description of consciousness and very careful to avoid actually building (or describing) a declarative worldview of your own.

It's all "It can't be this it can't be that" but no "It is this".

While the physical position can point to things and say "This is consciousness' I suspect that when you try to define it you will end up being circular, as I have outlined many times here. But until you actually define it you can keep jumping around and kidding yourself you have the high ground. It has all the hallmarks of creationism: know nothing about science and then just hand wave and say "the marvels of creation are obvious".

Understand, though, that I am perfectly open to you NOT having a circular definition/description. It's just that you have been so avoidant in asserting anything....assertive about it that I am suspicious.

So, what is consciousness on your view? If it is so tied up with subjective experience, then how do you know other people have it? What heuristic would you use to infer or detect it? Are animals conscious?

Re: The Kalam Cosmological Argument Explained

D Bnonn Tennant — Thu, 19 Sep 2013 23:01:53 -0000

I've described the problem many times in this thread.

Maybe you could explain why you think circularity is a difficulty for me.

Re: The Kalam Cosmological Argument Explained

peanutaxis — Thu, 19 Sep 2013 22:37:07 -0000

Okay. How would you describe the problem then? I don't think you can do it without being circular. Please prove me wrong though.

Again your categorizing is causing you problems - now your [false] categories have forced you to conclude that I am denying subjective experience. I am doing nothing of the sort - I fully accept that subjective experience exists - this is all about the explanation of it. While you subjectively decree things about subjective experience, real research and scholarship is being done on the subject.

Re: The Kalam Cosmological Argument Explained

D Bnonn Tennant — Thu, 19 Sep 2013 22:12:50 -0000

While it's really simple for me to understand you position - it's one line(and still circular) "subjective experience isn't physical because I don't [subjective experience] that it is"

A tacit admission that you don't know how to articulate the problem.

you could conclude that - despite us understanding exactly how and why the lobster reacts - that the lobster still has an internal subjective experience of the red light on top of the mere physical mechanism. Well, you might be correct. But it's a completely redundant and useless proposition.

Since we can verify this in humans already, you are basically admitting that my view is correct, but that it doesn't matter because we can't use science to understand it. But the fact we can't use science to understand subjective experience just seems to prove some kind of dualism. That is the only possible explanation. You're so blinded by your religion that you can't see the obvious.

Re: The Kalam Cosmological Argument Explained

peanutaxis — Thu, 19 Sep 2013 22:05:27 -0000

"But this is obviously wrong. For example, the perception of red may be caused by a particular wavelength of light encountering certain nerve systems, but it is not itself that wavelength of light encountering certain nerve systems."

Why not? You are simply espousing your intuitive ("obvious") belief that your subjective experience can't be made by your physical brain.

Lets say that a lobster reacts to red light by immediately moving towards it, and let's say that we someday can map and read everything that's going through it's brain when it does this - we can see how the input of red light affects the nerves in the brain and that the brain then 'outputs' to the motor nerves etc. I imagine that a person with your views will either have to then conclude that this shows that a lobster is not conscious at all and is just a physical 'machine', or you could conclude that - despite us understanding exactly how and why the lobster reacts - that the lobster still has an internal subjective experience of the red light on top of the mere physical mechanism. Well, you might be correct. But it's a completely redundant and useless proposition. It can't add to our understanding of any lobster's brain(assuming that we CAN explain all a lobster's functioning), and so it's completely unverifiable/unfalsifiable and pointless.

Now, when it comes to 'higher' brains like ours the prediction is that on top of purely instinctual reactions like a lobster (ever suddenly wake up while driving and realizing that you can't remember the last few km's? Notice how you had no subjective experience of those km's. Like a lobster, you were just an input-output system regards to traffic.) we have more complex associations, and we also have the ability to understand that we are a 'self' observing things. So, unlike the lobster's simple red-light-in:movement-out system we have many more thoughts and reactions when we see red, and also - unlike the lobster - we are able to observe that we are observing something (this is simply the ability to model the self).

The physicalist view of the brain makes perfect sense then. All brains model the world around them, but more complex one's can model themselves. The lobster has a simple representation of red light, while we have a more complex one. When we see red it brings many things come to mind(not just "move" like a lobster), and often emotions, but we can also include the 'self' in those equations - there is a circularity here.

But the real proof is in the future, of course. The physicalist prediction is that in the future we can decode the brain and show that the brain is but a complex input-output-system/symbol-manipulator which includes the recursive symbol 'self'. It would be amazing if we found some magic in there but I think the writing is on the wall. There was no magic in evolution. Or anything else we've studied, so betting on consciousness would be long odds.
What's funny is that every generation looks back at the 'silly' gaps that the previous generation put their supernaturalism/mysticism in and then promptly puts their beliefs in the next gap.

"The trouble is, you don't seem able to grasp this categorical distinction, so you keep begging the question while you think you're giving a perfectly good accounting of intentionality in physical terms."

Oh I grasp it, and I am giving the opposing and far more consistent view - there are no categories. It is you who has just defined the next potential bastion of mystery as non-physical, just as your(our) forebears did with the heavens, tides, life...

While it's really simple for me to understand you position - it's one line(and still circular) "subjective experience isn't physical because I don't [subjective experience] that it is" - it's hard for you to understand the physical position because it's complicated, but based in actual knowledge of the world around us - like neuroscience, information theory, complexity theory, emergence, feedback loops, heck even the downfall of logic - Godel's incompleteness theorem.
And why would you bother to inform yourself of these potential explanations since you 'know' they're wrong, anymore than a creationist bothers to inform himself of actual science?

I can''t help feel that anyone watching this has observed a 'crippled kid' beat the crap out of you with your own armchair.